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BORK: THE TRANSFORMATION OF A
CONSERVATIVE CONSTITUTIONALIST
Philip B. Kurland*
For Republican Party stalwarts, Robert Bork's appointment to
the Supreme Court represents President Reagan's last chance to put
the Reagan social program into effect. So they have said. The Presi-
dent failed early on to persuade the court to retract its position on
such things as abortion, privacy, prayers in school and fiscal assist-
ance to religion, and affirmative action. He failed to persuade Con-
gress to effect his programs by legislation and constitutional
amendment.
Now, having appointed two new Justices and elevated William
Rehnquist to Chief Justice, Reagan proposes another appointment,
which he expects to effect the rewriting of the Constitution to his lik-
ing. That is the basis on which he is selling his nominee to the right-
wing constituencies.
On the other hand, some Washington lawyers and their cabal-
mostly holdovers from Democratic administrations who have since
been executive branch tools, whichever party is in power-are seeking
to sell Bork to the moderates as one devoted only to judicial restraint,
one who is truly the model of Felix Frankfurter, of Robert Jackson, of
John Marshall Harlan. Nobody, of course, is offering Bork as a
swinging liberal in the tradition of William Douglas or Frank
Murphy.
Organized constituencies such as the Eagle Forum, the anti-abor-
tionists, and the Dolphin Society know where Bork stands: with them.
Other organized constituencies, like the National Organization for
Women and various civil liberties and civil rights organizations also
know where Bork stands: against them. These constituencies on both
sides are in agreement about the meaning of a Bork appointment.
For myself, the proper class into which Bork would fall as a
Supreme Court Justice is that of Pierce Butler, George Sutherland,
Willis Van Devanter, and James C. McReynolds. And I don't think
the nation can afford to be thrown back to the days when four such as
these maintained the critical mass in determining the meaning of the
Constitution.
* William R. Kenan Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago Law
School.
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But a Supreme Court nominee should not be approved simply
because he bears the imprimatur of the right wing of the Republican
Party or the nihil obstat of some holdovers from the New Deal. Nor
should he be rejected simply because of the worthiness of the opposi-
tion. The Senate's decision should be based on Judge Bork's record,
and his record is nothing if not clear, as he has gone from podium to
podium since becoming a judge electioneering to become a justice.
What is startling about the record is the violent change from the
''conservative" positions he took as an academic to the "conservative"
positions he has taken on the hustings. Bork became a different con-
stitutionalist after he wrote "Why I Am For Nixon" in The New Re-
public magazine in 49681 and found himself rewarded with the post of
Solicitor General.
Whatever he may have said or thought earlier, since 1969 Bork
has paid fealty to the Nixon administration's "strict construction"
thesis and the Reagan administration's "original intent." Like "strict
construction," "original intent," of course, is not a formula or a the-
ory but only a slogan pursuant to which old decisions can be replaced
by new ones.
Immediately before he joined the Nixon administration and
before the cry of original intent was heard in the land, Bork, the con-
stitutional scholar, pointed to the deficiencies of attempting to rely on
the so-called "intent" of the framers as determinative of the meaning
of the Constitution today:
The text of the Constitution, as anyone experienced with
words might expect, is least precise where it is most important.
Like the Ten Commandments, the Constitution enshrines
profound values but necessarily omits the minor premises required
to apply them. The First Amendment is a prime example.... To
apply the amendment, a judge must bring to the text principles,
judgments, and intuitions not to be found in the bare words.
When we turn to the equal-protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment... we know the clause was meant to be impor-
tant, [but] the words tell the judge very little ...
History can be of considerable help, but it tells us much too
little about the specific intentions of the men who framed, adopted,
and ratified the great clauses. The record is incomplete, the men
involved often had vague or even conflicting intentions, and no one
foresaw, or could have foreseen, the disputes that changing social
conditions and outlooks would bring before the Court. 2
I Bork, Why I Am For Nixon, The New Republic, June 1, 1968, at 19.
2 Bork, The Supreme Court Needs a New Philosophy, Fortune, Dec. 1968, at 138, 140.
[Vol. 9:127
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Today's Bork, however, iterates and reiterates the formula of
"original intention." For him, constitutional decisions can be based
on, and only on, the words of the text and the context in which they
were promulgated. A judge should not even feel bound by a prece-
dent of his own court. Thus, in the hearings on his nomination to the
Court of Appeals, he said that "if a court became convinced that it
had made a terrible mistake about a constitutional ruling in the past, I
think ultimately the real meaning of the Constitution ought to prevail
over a prior mistake by the court."3 A bit later he was a little more
cautious: "I think the value of precedent and of certainty and con-
tinuity in the law is so high that I think a judge ought not to overturn
prior decisions unless he is absolutely clear that that prior decision
was wrong and perhaps pernicious. ' But he boldly pronounced that
the only way to "cure" erroneous constitutional decisions was
through "the appointment process." 5 That proposition doesn't re-
quire much interpretation.
The problem is that, for Bork, there are a very large number of
Supreme Court cases that are "wrong and perhaps pernicious." 6 In
testifying on the Human Life Bill, he said: "[N]obody believes the
Constitution allows, much less demands, the decision in Roe v. Wade
[the abortion case] or in dozens of other cases in recent years."7
In an interview in the District Lawyer in 1985, he was asked:
"Can you identify any Supreme Court doctrines that you regard as
particularly worthy of reconsideration in the 1980s?" He responded:
"Yes, I can. But I won't."8
A quick currying of just some of his writings, however, reveals a
long list of cases damned by Bork as wanting support in the constitu-
tional text or its original context. These include, with varying terms
of acerbity or damnation, the abortion cases;9 the contraception
cases; 10 the reapportionment cases;1 Shelley v. Kraemer,12 making ra-
3 The Selection and Confirmation of Federal Judges: Hearings Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982).
4 Id. at 14.
5 Id. at 7.
6 Id. at 14.
7 Human Life Bill: Hearings on S. 158 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of
the Senate Judiciary Comm., 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 310, 315 (1981).
8 Lacovara, A Talk With Judge Robert H. Bork, 9 Dist. Law. 29, 32 (May-June 1985).
9 E.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
(1986); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
10 E.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
11 E.g., Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
12 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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cially restrictive covenants unenforceable; Katzenbach v. Morgan ,'3
suggesting a congressional power to add to the rights protected by the
fourteenth amendment; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 4 striking down a law
providing for involuntary sterilization of criminals; Engel v. Vitale,"5
banning the use of a state-created prayer in public grammar schools;
Aguilar v. Felton, 6 banning the use of federal funds to support paro-
chial schools; and University of California Board of Regents v.
Bakke, 7 allowing race to be taken into account in admitting univer-
sity students (affirmative action). There are lots more.
The principal difficulty with the thrust of Attorney General Ed-
win Meese's "original intent" thesis-and it is Meese's thesis that
Bork seems to have borrowed-is that its main target of application is
the Bill of Rights. Meese properly asserts that the Bill of Rights origi-
nally was not to be applied to the states. The logical conclusion-
ignoring the fourteenth amendment-is to remove the restraints of
the national Constitution from state action ranging from violation of
the establishment clause in the first amendment to restraints that have
been placed on the use of capital punishment, partly based on the
eighth amendment.
Bork's entire current constitutional jurisprudential theory is es-
sentially directed to a diminution of minority and individual rights.
In his recent Boyer Lecture to the American Enterprise Institute, he
condemned the view that "moral harms are not to be counted because
to do so would interfere with the autonomy of the individual.... The
result of discounting moral harm is the privatization of morality,
which requires the law of the community to practice moral relativism.
[Horror of horrors!] It is thought that individuals are entitled to their
moral beliefs ... in law."'" He said later in the same speech: "One of
the freedoms, the major freedom, of our kind of society is the freedom
to choose to have a public morality."' 19 I trust he was not talking
about the public morality, proffered at the Watergate and Iranscam
hearings, that the end justifies the means.
But listen to the views of Professor Bork, rather than Judge
Bork, who wrote in 1968: "[M]oral disapproval alone cannot be ac-
cepted as a sufficient rationale for any coercion. If it were there would
be no limit to the reach of the majority's power, and that contradicts
13 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
14 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
15 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
16 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
17 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
18 R. Bork, Tradition and Morality in Constitutional Law 1, 3 (1984).
19 Id. at 9.
[Vol. 9:127
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the basic postulate of a Madisonian system."20 The fact is that Bork
invokes constitutional history often in support of his current posi-
tions, but seldom cites chapter and verse. This time he happened to
be right in his history, although usually he has been less than
accurate.
In a much-cited article in the Indiana Law Journal in 1971, now
"recanted," though to what extent we know not, Bork contended that
the protection of speech and press should be limited to cover only
political speech.2 (On the bench, Bork seems to have been convinced
that the Constitution did not mean for juries to fix punitive damages
in libel suits, at least against Evans and Novak. If the purpose of the
development at the time of the founding has any historical signifi-
cance, it was to enhance, not diminish, the role of juries in libel cases.)
But, again, when he was still an academic, in 1968, Bork endorsed the
Brandeisian notion of an extensive reading of the first amendment's
protected speech, certainly far more extensive than Bork is now pre-
pared to defend:
Yet nonpolitical speech too, of course, is entitled to some degree of
constitutional protection. Brandeis cited other values of speech
that are not unique to the political variety. For both speaker and
hearer, speech may be a source of enjoyment, of self-fulfillment, of
personal development. It is often mundane or vulgar or self-serv-
ing, but it may be exalted, inspired by the highest motives.22
One strain of consistency runs through Bork's jurisprudence
from his law school days through yesterday. Strangely, however, it
patently fails his notion of adhering to the original intent of the legis-
lature enacting the law. I speak of his commitment to the notion that
the Sherman Antitrust Act bars only anticompetitive devices resulting
in economic inefficiency. This he learned as a schoolboy at the Uni-
versity of Chicago. For Bork, it would seem that the only natural law
required to be given effect by the Supreme Court is that of supply and
demand, unrestrained by moral considerations, public or private.
The Constitution created powers in the national government.
Bork would read these as unlimited, so long as they receive a majority
vote of the legislature and do not fall directly afoul of a specifically
worded constitutional limitation. Bork's view of history here, as of
most of the history on which he would rely, is myopic.
It was expected by the founders that, in light of one of the princi-
20 Bork, supra note 2, at 171.
21 Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 20
(1971).
22 Bork, supra note 2, at 170.
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pal objectives of the Constitution-indeed the one that worried them
most, the preservation of individual liberties-the powers of govern-
ment would be narrowly construed. In a further effort to confine the
national government, however, some individual rights were specifi-
cally guaranteed in the Constitution, such as the ban on limiting
habeas corpus, the ban on bills of attainder, the ban on ex post facto
laws. An additional list of rights guaranteed to the people were added
in the first eight amendments.
From the beginning, though, the dangers of listing only some of
the protected individual rights was seen in the common law maxim
inclusio unius, exclusio alterius (including one excludes another).
Hamilton and Madison both originally opposed a Bill of Rights for
that reason. And when Madison brought in a Bill of Rights for pro-
mulgation by the first Congress, carefully included were the provi-
sions of what is now the ninth amendment: "The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or dis-
parage others retained by the people."23
The contemporary Bork's constitutional canons would confine
individual rights to those safeguarded in terms in the Constitution,
despite his pronounced position that the words of the Constitution
taken in their historical context are the only proper guide to its mean-
ing. At one time, when he was still a scholar, however, Bork extolled
the ninth amendment as a source of rights. He wrote in 1968:
A desire for some legitimate form of judicial activism is inherent in
a tradition ... that can be called "Madisonian." We continue to
believe there are some things no majority should be allowed to do
to us, no matter how democratically it may decide to do them. A
Madisonian system assumes that in wide areas of life a legislative
majority is entitled to rule for no better reason than that it is a
majority. But it also assumes there are some aspects of life a ma-
jority should not control, that coercion in such matters is tyranny,
a violation of the individual's natural rights. Clearly the definition
of natural rights cannot be left to either the majority or the minor-
ity. In the popular understanding upon which the power of the
Supreme Court rests, it is precisely the function of the Court to
resolve this dilemma by giving content to the concept of natural
rights in case-by-case interpretation of the Constitution. This re-
quires the Court to have, and demonstrate the validity of, a theory
of natural rights ....
Legitimate activism requires, first of all, a warrant for the
Court to move beyond the limited range of substantive rights that
can be derived from traditional sources of constitutional law. The
23 U.S. Const., amend. IX.
[Vol. 9:127
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case for locating this warrant in the long-ignored Ninth Amend-
ment was persuasively argued by Justice Arthur J. Goldberg in a
concurring opinion in Griswold vs. Connecticut E24] [the decision in-
validating Connecticut's anticontraception law on grounds of the
right to privacy].... This seems to mean that the Bill of Rights is
an incomplete, open-ended document, and that the work of com-
pletion is, at least in major part, a task for the Supreme Court.
There is some historical evidence that this is substantially what
Madison intended.
The construction of new rights can start from existing
constitutional guarantees, particularly the first eight amendments,
which may be taken as specific examples of the general set of natu-
ral rights contemplated by the Madisonian system and the Ninth
Amendment.25
Bork, although frequently prating about the Constitution and
original intent as he has taken to the hustings around the country, has
woefully missed what he should have learned from the Constitutional
Convention of 1787 and the events surrounding it.
The watchword of the people and the constitutional and ratifying
conventions was "liberty." They were intent on framing a govern-
ment to guarantee liberty to the individuals within the new nation's
domain. The liberty of which they spoke was not Bork's liberty of a
parliamentary majority to impose its will on everyone with regard to
everything. No such elaborate structure as that which emerged would
have been necessary for that.
The liberty of which they spoke and wrote and for which they
fought was the liberty of the individual, in "substance," as Judge
Learned Hand once put it, "the possibility of the individual expres-
sion of life on the terms of him who has to live it."26 Judge Hand
added:
Would we hold liberty, we must have charity-charity to others,
charity to ourselves, crawling up from the moist ovens of a steam-
ing world, still carrying the passional equipment of our ferocious
ancestors, emerging from black superstition amid carnage and
atrocity to our perilous present. What shall it profit us, who come
so by our possessions, if we have not charity?2 7
Is it too much to ask of a member of the high court that he be
more than a technically well-equipped lawyer, that he also display the
24 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
25 Bork, supra note 2, at 168-170, col. 1.
26 L. Hand, Sources of Tolerance, in The Spirit of Liberty 66, 82 (1952).
27 Id. at 83.
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qualities of humility and compassion and understanding-of states-
manship? Aren't these the qualities that distinguished a Stone, a
Frankfurter, a Jackson, and a Harlan, conservatives all, from a But-
ler, a McReynolds, a Van Devanter, a Sutherland?
Almost any adult lawyer can parse the words of the Constitution.
If that is all that is wanted, we could probably leave it to a computer.
Let us have a judge, if a judge it must be, like a Learned Hand or a
Henry Friendly, who were clearly committed to judicial restraint, but
who understood the frailties of men and women, judges and judged
alike.*
* Reprinted with permission from Kurland, Bork, The Transformation of a Conservative
Constitutionalist, Chi. Trib., August 18, 1987, § 1.
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